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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Melissa Heiner, a.k.a. Olin, appeals from her judgment of conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine.  On appeal, she argues that the district court erred 
when it declined her requested mistake of fact instruction and abused its discretion 
when it subsequently denied her motion for a new trial. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The district court set forth the factual background of this case as follows: 
On May 18, 2015, Trooper S. Call of the Idaho State Police 
observed a black Dodge truck traveling directly in front of his patrol 
vehicle.  Trooper Call observed the registration on the rear license plate 
had expired in April.  After confirming the expired license with the dispatch 
center, Trooper Call conducted a traffic stop on the truck.  Trooper Call 
made contact with the driver of the vehicle, who was identified as Cody M. 
Olin.  Mr. Olin told the trooper his driver’s license was suspended.  The 
Defendant in this case, Melissa E. Olin, was a passenger in the truck.  
Trooper Call informed Mr. Olin of the reason for the traffic stop and then 
proceeded to conduct a driver’s check on both of the Olins.  As a result of 
that check, Trooper Call confirmed that Mr. Olin’s driving status was 
invalid and further learned that he had a misdemeanor warrant for his 
arrest based on a probation violation out of Bonneville County.  Trooper 
Call also discovered the Defendant’s license was suspended out of 
California.  Trooper Call then requested another officer to assist him with 
the stop.  Officer P. Boll from the Pocatello Police arrived on the scene, 
and Trooper Call proceeded to arrest Mr. Olin on the basis of the 
Bonneville County warrant.  After Mr. Olin was handcuffed, Trooper Call 
conducted a pat down search.  In the course of that search, Trooper Call 
located a plastic bag inside Mr. Olin’s baseball cap.  A white crystal 
substance was inside the bag, and, upon questioning by the trooper, 
Mr. Olin “stated that [the substance in the bag] was methamphetamine.” 
 
Eventually, Trooper Call made contact with the Defendant, asking 
her to step outside of the truck.  Trooper Call informed the Defendant he 
was going to search the vehicle.  He observed a purse on the floor board 
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where the Defendant had been sitting.  Ms. Olin confirmed the purse 
belonged to her.  Trooper Call searched the purse and discovered other 
small coin purses within the purse.  Inside a black coin purse, Trooper Call 
discovered a white bag with a white residue.  Upon inquiry, the Defendant 
stated the white substance was aspirin.  Trooper Call then found a blue 
coin purse, which held a black plastic bag.  That black plastic bag also 
contained a white residue.  The black bag with white residue tested 
presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  The white bag with residue 
did not test presumptive positive for methamphetamine.  Following the 
results of the NIK test, Trooper Call placed the Defendant under arrest for 
methamphetamine.  No other illegal items were found in the vehicle. 
 
(R., pp.226-27 (brackets original; internal citations and footnotes omitted).)  The state 
charged Heiner with possession of methamphetamine (R., pp.40-41), and her case 
eventually went to trial (R., pp.212-17). 
At trial, the defense presented a lack of knowledge defense to the possession 
charge.  Cody Olin, Heiner’s son, explained that a couple days before their arrests, his 
mother asked him to bring her some aspirin at her work.  (Tr., p.236, L.18 – p.237, L.7.)  
He testified that he placed the aspirin in a white plastic baggie that had previously 
contained methamphetamine (Tr., p.237, L.11 – p.239, L.1; p.254, L.21 – p.255, L.1); 
before putting the aspirin in the baggie, he cleaned it by blowing it out (Tr., p.254, Ls.14-
19); he then took the baggie to his mother’s work and placed it in her purse (Tr., p.237, 
Ls.11-22; p.255, Ls.2-15).  Finally, he testified that he only placed the one white baggie 
of aspirin in Heiner’s purse.  (Tr., p.255, Ls.16-22.)  Heiner also testified, confirming that 
her son had brought her some aspirin in a baggie and asserting that she had no 
knowledge that the residue in one of the two baggies later found in her purse was 
methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.260, L.3 – p.264, L.22.) 
After the close of evidence, the district court asked the parties if they had any 
additional jury instructions to request.  (Tr., p.271, Ls.10-14; p.276, Ls.5-7.)  At first, 
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defense counsel responded that he did not.  (Tr., p.276, L.8.)  However, he later 
changed his mind (Tr., p.279, Ls.2-4), and ultimately requested an instruction based on 
Idaho Code § 18-201(1) (Tr., p.283, L.1 – p.284, L.3; R., p.211).  The district court 
denied the request on the ground that the proposed instruction was adequately covered 
by the district court’s instructions.  (Tr., p.286, Ls.20-24.)  
The jury found Heiner guilty of possession of methamphetamine.  (Tr., p.327, 
L.16 – p.329, L.19; R., p.224.)  Heiner filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a 
new trial based on instructional error (R., pp.205-08), which the district court denied (R., 
pp.226-30).  The district court entered judgment against Heiner and sentenced her to a 
unified term of five years with two years fixed, suspended that sentence, and placed her 
on probation for a period of four years.  (R., pp.236-41.)  Heiner filed a timely notice of 
appeal.  (R., pp.243-45.) 
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ISSUES 
Heiner states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Whether the district court erred when it denied Ms. Heiner’s request 
to instruct the jury pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1). 
 
2. Alternatively, whether the district court erred when it denied 
Ms. Heiner’s motion for a new trial based on the failure to instruct the jury 
pursuant to I.C. § 18-201(1). 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
1. Has Heiner failed to show error in the district court’s instructions to the jury? 
 
2. Because the district court correctly instructed the jury, has Heiner failed to show 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial, 
which was premised on alleged instructional error? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Heiner Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court’s Instructions To The Jury 
 
A. Introduction 
On appeal, Heiner claims that the district court erroneously instructed the jury 
when it declined her requested mistake of fact instruction.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.7-11.)  
Contrary to Heiner’s claims, the legal substance of her requested instruction was 
adequately covered by the pattern-modeled instructions given in this case.  The district 
court correctly instructed the jury and should be affirmed. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 
853, 864-65 (2011) (citing State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 659, 8 P.3d 652, 654 
(2000)).  “An erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the 
instructions as a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party.”  State v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 600-01 (2010). 
 
C. The District Court Correctly Instructed The Jury 
 
Consistent with the pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, the district court 
instructed the jury in this case that: 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, the state must prove each of the following: 
 
1. On or about May 18, 2015 
 
2. in the state of Idaho 
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3. the defendant Melissa Edna Olin possessed any 
amount of methamphetamine, and 
 
4. the defendant either knew it was methamphetamine 
or believed it was a controlled substance. 
 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty.  If each of the above has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the 
defendant guilty. 
 
(Instruction No. 15 (Exs., p.24); compare with I.C.J.I. 403.)  The district court also 
instructed the jury that “[a] person has possession of something if the person knows of 
its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it.”  
(Instruction No. 17 (Exs., p.26).)  The pattern instructions are presumptively correct 
statements of law, and trial courts are expected to use them unless another instruction 
would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the applicable law.  State v. Reid, 
151 Idaho 80, 85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 2011).  Here, the district court gave the 
pattern instruction for possession of methamphetamine, and no other instruction would 
have offered a better statement of the law.   
In addition to these presumptively correct instructions, Heiner requested an 
additional jury instruction on mistake of fact, mirroring the language of Idaho Code § 18-
201(1), under which a person is not capable of committing a crime if the person who 
committed the act that is charged did so “under an ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves any criminal intent.”  (Tr., p.283, L.1 – p.284, L.3; R., p.211.)  The district 
court denied this request, correctly determining that Heiner’s proposed instruction was 
already adequately covered by the court’s instructions.  (Tr., p.286, Ls.20-24.) 
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In fact, more than merely being adequately covered by the instructions, Heiner’s 
proposed instruction was entirely duplicative of the pattern element instruction.  As the 
Idaho Supreme Court has previously recognized, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c), which 
criminalizes possession of a controlled substance, “does not contain any mental 
element.”  State v. Fox, 124 Idaho 924, 926, 866 P.2d 181, 183 (1993).  Rather, that 
requirement was developed through the precedents of this Court.  In Fox, the Court 
rejected the argument that a mistake of fact defense under Idaho Code § 18-201(1) 
could be available to a defendant who knew the nature of the substance he or she 
possessed, but was unaware that the substance was illegal.  Id. at 926, 866 P.2d at 
183.  Then, in State v. Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 633, 945 P.2d 1, 4 (1997), the Court 
determined that where a defendant did not know the nature of the substance he or she 
possessed, a mistake of fact defense under Idaho Code § 18-201(1) was available.  
Following Lamphere, the committee amended the pattern jury instruction by adding 
element four.  See I.C.J.I. 403, comment 6.  Thus, element four of the pattern instruction 
is the instruction on mistake of fact under Idaho Code § 18-201(1). 
A defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction that is an erroneous statement of 
the law, is not supported by the evidence, is an impermissible comment on the 
evidence, or is adequately covered by other instructions.  State v. Johns, 112 Idaho 
873, 881, 736 P.2d 1327, 1335 (1987).  On appeal, Heiner claims that she was entitled 
to her requested instruction because, she asserts, “[a] reasonable view of at least some 
evidence support[ed her] theory” that she did not know the substance she possessed 
was methamphetamine.  (Appellant’s brief, p.8.)  But Heiner ignores the fact that, if the 
jury agreed with her theory of the case—that Heiner believed the residue in one of the 
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baggies she possessed was aspirin and not methamphetamine (or some other 
controlled substance1)—the jury could not have convicted Heiner under the instructions 
already given.  Her proposed jury instruction, therefore, was adequately covered by 
(and in fact duplicative of) the presumptively correct model instructions already given, 
and the district court correctly denied Heiner’s requested instruction. 
Heiner, relying on the Court’s opinion in State v. Blake, 133 Idaho 237, 985 P.2d 
117 (1999), also argues that the general instruction on possession is inadequate 
because, she asserts, it could allow a jury to convict a defendant where the defendant 
did not know she was in possession of an illegal substance, but thought it was 
something benign.  (Appellant’s brief, p.10.)  Heiner’s reliance on Blake is misplaced.  
The jury instructions in Blake were different from those given in this case in a crucial 
aspect:  In Blake, the jury was instructed—consistent with the pattern instruction then in 
use—that it could find the defendant guilty if the state proved that “the Defendant knew 
or should have known that the substance possessed was a controlled substance.”  
Blake, 133 Idaho at 240-41, 985 P.2d at 120-21 (emphasis original).   
The pattern instructions on possession of a controlled substance have been 
updated since Blake to better reflect Idaho Code § 18-201(1).  As noted by the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Hopper, 142 Idaho 512, 514, 129 P.3d 1261, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005), 
they now require the state to prove that “the defendant either knew it was [name of 
substance] or believed it was a controlled substance.”  The Court’s conclusion in that 
case is equally relevant to this case:  “Unlike the instructions in Blake, which allowed a 
                                            
1  Of course, had Heiner believed that the residue she possessed was cocaine and not 
methamphetamine, though still technically mistaken, this would not be a defense to 
possession of a controlled substance. 
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finding of guilty if the defendant was unaware the substance [she] possessed was a 
controlled substance, the instructions in this case allowed the jury to find [Heiner] guilty 
only if it concluded [she] knowingly possessed methamphetamine.”  Id.   
Because the presumptively correct jury instructions given by the district court 
required the state to prove that Heiner knowingly possessed methamphetamine, her 
proposed instruction was already adequately covered by the instructions given, and the 
district court correctly declined Heiner’s superfluous instruction.  Heiner has failed to 
show that the district court erred by declining to give her requested instruction.  Heiner’s 
judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine should be affirmed. 
 
II. 
Heiner Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Denied Her Motion For A New Trial 
 
A. Introduction 
Heiner argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied her 
motion for a new trial.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.11-12.)  Application of the correct legal 
standards shows no abuse of the district court’s discretion. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
Granting or denying a motion for a new trial is within the district court’s discretion 
and will not be disturbed on appeal unless that discretion is abused.  State v. Jones, 
127 Idaho 478, 481, 903 P.2d 67, 70 (1995). 
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C. The District Court Properly Denied Heiner’s Motion For A New Trial 
Following her conviction for possession of methamphetamine, Heiner moved for 
a new trial alleging that, by omitting her proposed instruction on Idaho Code § 18-
201(1), the court had erroneously instructed the jury.  (R., pp.205-08.)  Concluding that 
the jury had been properly instructed because, inter alia, Heiner’s proposed instruction 
was already adequately covered by the instructions already given, the district court 
denied Heiner’s motion.  (R., pp.226-30.)  The district court was correct.  As shown 
above (see Argument I(C), supra), and contrary to Heiner’s arguments on appeal, her 
proposed instruction was adequately covered by (and duplicative of) the instructions 
which required the state to prove Heiner knew the substance she possessed was 
methamphetamine, or at least believed it was a controlled substance. 
On appeal, Heiner asserts that the instructions were inadequate because they 
did not inform the jury that, if Heiner acted under a mistake of fact, she would not be 
capable of forming the requisite knowledge.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  This argument 
appears to misunderstand Idaho Code § 18-201(1).  By its unambiguous terms, a 
mistake of fact alone is insufficient for that statute to apply; rather, the mistake of fact 
must disprove any criminal intent.  I.C. § 18-201(1).  In the context of possession of a 
controlled substance, the defendant’s mistake of fact must raise a reasonable doubt on 
whether the defendant believed he or she possessed something other than a controlled 
substance.  For instance, to raise the defense under the statute in this case, the jury 
would have needed reasonable doubt on element four regarding whether Heiner 
believed she possessed aspirin residue instead of methamphetamine residue.  But 
contrary to Heiner’s assertions, under the instructions given to the jury, if there was a 
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reasonable doubt that Heiner believed she possessed aspirin, the jury was already 
required to acquit her.  (See Instruction No. 15 (Exs., p.24).)  On the other hand, if the 
jury concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Heiner knew that she possessed 
methamphetamine residue, then there is no mistake of fact and the jury could properly 
convict her.  Finally, if the jury accepted that Heiner was unaware that the substance 
she possessed was methamphetamine residue, but concluded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that she believed it was some other controlled substance, Heiner’s mistake of fact 
would not disprove criminal intent, and the jury could still properly convict her.  Thus, the 
only defense available under Idaho Code § 18-201(1) is the same defense already 
granted by element four of the pattern jury instruction. 
Heiner also emphasizes the Court’s holding in State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 
82, 356 P.3d 368, 375 (2015), that “the defendant’s ignorance of the identity of a 
substance would be a defense to a charge of possession of a controlled substance” to 
support her arguments.  (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)  What Heiner fails to recognize is, 
under the presumptively correct pattern jury instructions offered in this case, that 
defense was available to Heiner—and she in fact availed herself of it.  (See Tr., p.236, 
L.13 – p.241, L.17; p.260, L.3 – p.264, L.22; p.307, L.15 – p.314, L.9.)  The jury rejected 
that defense, necessarily (under the instructions) concluding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Heiner in fact knew that the residue she possessed was methamphetamine 
or that she at least believed that it was some other controlled substance. 
The district court properly denied Heiner’s motion for a new trial because, as it 
correctly concluded, the jury in her trial was properly instructed.  Heiner has failed to 
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show that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion.  The district 
court’s order denying Heiner’s motion for a new trial should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Heiner’s conviction for 
possession of methamphetamine, and affirm the district court’s order denying Heiner’s 
motion for a new trial. 
 DATED this 6th day of July, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer__________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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